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for Korea’s Public Officials 
 
Myung Jae Moon, Ju-Ho Lee 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article criticizes that the personnel management system for Korean public officials is 
seriously lacking competition among public employees and fails to nurture their competence and 
confidence due to too much reliance on rank, seniority, closed recruitment, and excessive 
rotation of positions as well as due to the consequent problems of deep-seated ministry 
selfishness and rising political influence over public officials. To redress such a state of crisis, 
we suggest that the new talent management system for Korean public officials should be 
introduced through 3C (competition, competence, and confidence) strategies and three major 
reforms that include abolishment of the elite recruitment system at the fifth-level, abolishment of 
the career path in which most public employees serve for a single ministry for entire duration of 
their careers, and introduction of the matrix personnel management system that combines the 
vertical management with the horizontal one. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The Fourth Industrial Revolution is coming fast.  The barriers that once stood between academia 
and technology is starting to crumble, and the digital convergence connecting objects to lives of 
people is beginning to accelerate its pace. In addition to technological transition, globalization, 
social polarization, low fertility and aging society, and industrial restructuring have made the 
administrative environments for many countries increasingly more complex and diverse. These 
are the new kinds of challenging or ‘wicked’ problems (Head & Alford, 2008) that countries 
must deal with today. Thus, countries are now faced with the pressures of coming Fourth 
Industrial Revolution while struggling to find answers to these ‘wicked problems’ at the same 
time. It will be only 10 years until winners and losers of the Fourth Industrial Revolution are 
clearly separated. Therefore, in this crucial moment in time, it will be imperative for the 
government to establish and implement new strategies to cope with these problems and take the 
lead by becoming the main agent of change and transforming itself. 
To this end, this paper focuses especially on the competency of public officials as one of the 
key factors determining success of the transformation. It is commonly observed that often the 
deciding factor of policy results is how effectively public employees conduct their administrative 
works. This still holds true today, but the reputations of public officials, who were once touted as 
the leaders of national developments, are no longer the same as can be seen by the mounting 
public distrusts on public employees. In the minds of citizens, the ideal images of public officials 
are agents who provide public services and who realize national visions as pillars of national 
developments. In reality, however, citizens now view public officials with resentments and 
criticisms (Figure 1). As a consequence, public officials of today are overwhelmingly judged to 
be incompetent and ill equipped with skills necessary to solve the social problems and lead the 
national development in today’s increasingly diverse and complex society. Therefore, in order 
for the government to become an organization that can satisfy the demands of the upcoming 
technological and social changes in complex administrative environments, the government must 
be able to recruit talented individuals and also develop their capabilities to the fullest to cultivate 
competent administrative experts appropriate for the ever-changing future. Otherwise, the 
government will neither be ready for the demands of the Fourth Industrial Revolution nor be able 
to cooperate actively with the market when critical. 
In short, the focus of this paper is on the fact that under the new era of the ever-converging, 
hyper-connected, and citizen-led society, individual expertise and capabilities demanded on 
public officials are far greater than those in the past. In other words, major reforms in the public 
employee management system are in order. To this end, we suggest introducing a new talent 
management system for Korea’s public officials, overhauling the public employee personnel 
management system from recruitments and position assignments to evaluations and promotions. 
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Figure 1. Ideal Images and Social Distrust of Public employees 
 
Ideal Images of Public Officials  Social Distrust on Public Officials 
Public Servants 
Pillars of National Developments 
Realize National Visions 
Providers of Public Services 
Politically Neutral / Fair 
Self-Sacrifice 
 ‘Iron Rice Bowl,’ Corruption 
Ministerial Selfishness 
Reigning, Bossy 
Desk Administration, Incompetent 
No Souls 
Rigid, Complacent 
Sources: Adapted from Moon and Park (2015; 148). 
 
 
2. Problems with the Personnel Management System for Public Officials 
 
The competency gap between public employees and private sector workers are growing in Korea. 
A recent empirical research1 based on the OECD data showed a shocking result that various 
competencies (numeracy, literacy, problem solving of Korea’s public sector employees were 
evaluated to be lower than those of private sector workers (Lee et al., 2016). This is a worrisome 
sign for policy makers. For any organization, regardless of whether it belongs to public or private 
sectors, all matters related to employees including recruitment, education and training, and 
general management of human capital such as putting the right employees at the right places 
have always been of utmost priority, as the Korean saying goes, “Personnel is everything.” This 
is truer than ever in this era. As administrative environments become more complex and roles 
taken by the government become more diversified, there are greater demands on the government 
to hire talented individuals and nurture them into pillars of innovations and development, in 
order to take advantage of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and gain national competitiveness, 
the importance of human resource management cannot be overemphasized.  
Although the Korean government has been making various efforts to enhance capacities of 
its public officials through processes of recruiting outstanding talents, providing continuous 
education and skill development programs, and utilizing private sector experts, innovations in the 
recruitment system of public officials are still limited, and even the plans to utilize private sector 
experts have not been fruitful thus far. For instance, the Ministry of Personnel Management 
announced in 2016 work plan that it would expand the number of experienced recruitment 
positions to 50% of the 437 open positions (as of 2015).2 However, its size so far has not even 
reached 1% of the total recruitment.3   
                                                            
1 The research utilized the OECD’s PIIAC (Program for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies) 
survey dataset which was conducted between 2011 and 2012. It samples adults aged 16 to 65 in each target countries 
and covers literacy, numeracy, and key information-processing skills (as indicated by problem solving in 
technology-rich environment; Lee et al., 2016: 75). 
2 Seoul Economy, 2016. 01. 26. 
3 In 2015, there were 30,588 newly recruited public officials and among them only 166 were recruited through open 
recruitment process. 
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At present, the recruitment system of public officials in Korea can be divided into entry-level 
and experienced recruitment systems. Examining each in detail, first, the entry-level recruitment 
system itself can be further split into national and regional public officials. In terms of position 
levels, the entry-level recruitment system hires fifth-, seventh-, and ninth-level public officials, 
and with respect to tasks, there are administrative, technical, and special services public officials. 
All Koreans can apply for the entry-level positions regardless of education level, and the process 
essentially involves two written tests and one final interview. The recruitment process occurs in 
accordance with the State Public Officials Act, and organizations that conduct this type of 
recruitment process include the Ministry of Personnel Management, the Korea Meteorological 
Administration, the Statistics Korea, and the National Election Commission (Table 1). 
Conversely, the experienced recruitment system shows somewhat different characteristics to 
the entry-level counterpart. First of all, the experienced recruitment system, by its nature, is a 
process conducted when there is a need for specialized talents in a specific field. As such, one 
notable difference with respect to the entry-level recruitment system is that eligibility criteria for 
the experienced recruitment system include certifications or relevant work experiences in the 
private sector for the specified field (Seo, 2012) while the other is essentially open to all Koreans. 
Likewise, the entry-level positions are recruited periodically, but the experienced recruitment 
system is non-periodic. Moreover, the number of experienced positions recruited and their 
requirements are not fixed each time, naturally, but rather are determined flexibly depending on 
the situations of each hiring ministry. According to a research by Ahn and Kim (2013), as of 
2015, about 33% of all hiring was completed through the experienced recruitment system since 
its inception in 2011.  
One recent trend observed in relation to the hiring of public officials is gradual increases in 
the proportion of those recruited through the experienced recruitment system. The rationale 
behind the trend appears to be based on the fact that that although the entry-level recruitment 
system guarantees fairness and objectivity as it selects individuals based on equal criteria for 
everybody, it is not particularly apt at discovering outstanding talents with both task competency 
and specialized skill sets (Park & Kim, 2005; Moon & Park, 2015). On the other hand, the 
experienced recruitment system can flexibly hire individuals with the right abilities, expertise, 
and experiences for the given position at the right time, filling the gaps unfulfilled by the entry-
level recruitment processes (Moon et al., 2016). Furthermore, as a potential solution to the 
frequently voiced concern that among the entry-level recruitment systems, the fifth-level 
recruitment in particular induced the problem of exclusiveness within organizations, introduction 
of the experienced recruitment system, which lowers entry barrier into organizations for 
individuals from private sectors and allows hiring of talented individuals seems to be the right 
response. Therefore, it is apparent that through the experienced recruitment system, the 
government aimed to foster competency of public officials while resolving one of the chronic 
problems of government ministries, which is exclusiveness.  However, despite the consensus on 
the need to innovate personnel management system including the recruitment of public officials, 
several institutional problems have yet to be solved.  
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Table 1. Entry Level and Experienced Recruitment Systems 
 
 Entry Level Recruitment Experienced Recruitment 
Concept  Stresses guaranteeing fair 
opportunity; to select talented public 
employees; targeted for unspecified 
masses 
 An examination to recruit employees 
in specific areas where recruitment is 
difficult through the entry level 
system. It is targeted for experts or 
people with experiences in relevant 
fields. 
Legal Basis  State Public Officials Act: Article 28, 
31, and 35 
 Decree on the Appointment of Public 
Officials: Chapter 2 Section 1 
 Decree on the Appointment 
Examination of Public Officials: 
Article 21-25 
 State Public Officials Act: Article 28 
 Decree on the Appointment of Public 
Officials: Chapter 2 Section 2 
 Decree on the Appointment 
Examination of Public Officials: 
Article 26-30 
Types  Fifth-level for administration and 
technical positions as well as for 
position in foreign affairs and trade  
 Seventh and ninth level 
 Career positions recruitment with 
background in relevant fields 
Requirement  No particular requirement other than 
minimum age (some category of 
positions have licenses as 
requirements in accordance with the 
Article 18 of the Decree on the 
Appointment Examination of Public 
Officials) 
 Restricted by licenses, work 
experiences, or academic degrees 
Conducting 
Organization 
 Mainly conducted by the Ministry of 
Public Administration and Security 
o Fifth-level and above 
o Sixth-level and below: 
conducted for 14 categories of 
positions 
 The Ministry of Meteorological 
Administration, the Statistics Korea, 
the National Election Commission 
 Mainly conducted by minister of 
recruiting ministry 
Sources: Seo (2012); adapted from Moon and Park (2015; 137) 
 
First, the rank and seniority systems is impeding widespread adoption of competition- and 
ability-centered personnel management systems. According to the results of Measures to 
Strengthen Capacity of Public Offices, a survey conducted by the Korean Development Institute 
in 2015, top-down rank culture and seniority custom still constitute significant parts of the 
7 
culture within public offices (Moon & Park, 2015). Among the 250 public employees who 
responded to the survey, 148 employees (59%) agreed that there does exist a top-down culture in 
which they find it difficult to disagree with opinions of superiors (Moon & Park, 2015). This is 
more than three times as large as the number of employees (42 employees; 16.8%) who did not 
see any top-down culture within public offices (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Results of the Survey on Public Office Culture: Top-Down  
 Highly 
Agree 
Somewh
at 
Disagree
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree
Somewhat 
Agree 
Highly 
Agree 
No 
Response 
Total 
Hard to Disagree 
with Opinions of 
Superiors 
5 (2) 37 (15) 59 (24) 112 (45) 36 (14) 1 (0.4) 250 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate percentage of the total. 
Sources: Adapted from Moon and Park (2015; 149). 
 
Because of such top-down and seniority cultures, public employees face situations in which 
they cannot assert their opinions once they are met with disagreement by their superiors even if 
they have ideas and willingness to innovate existing task processes. Furthermore, as it is difficult 
to voice differing opinions to those of superiors’ even when opinions of superiors may be 
irrational or contain problems, the whole organizations could go down the path leading to 
unreasonable results. In the end, the top-down rank culture fosters negative environments where 
members within organizations choose to become complacent rather than transformative and 
innovative. Indeed, according to the 2015 KDI survey mentioned earlier, 86 public officials 
(34.4%) agreed and 95 (38%) neither agreed nor disagreed to the questionnaire asking whether 
“it is risky for my career if I advocate too innovative things.” In contrast, only 68 public 
employees (27%) disagreed, confirming that there are indeed more complacent public employees 
than those who are not (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Results of the Survey on Public Office Culture: Complacency 
 Highly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Highly 
Agree
No 
Response 
Total 
Advocating Too 
Innovative Things 
are Risky to My 
Career 
8 (3) 60 (24) 95 (38) 71 (28) 15 (6) 1 (0.4) 250 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate percentage of the total. 
Sources: Adapted from Moon and Park (2015; 149). 
 
Second, there is a problem that personnel management continues to stay rigid because of 
closed recruitment system of public officials. There are researches on exclusivity of public 
employee society indicating that the problem arises from the closed recruitment system (Park, 
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Baek, & Lim, 2004; Park & Kim, 2005; Kim & Lee, 2012). In reality, however, it is not easy to 
transform the current closed recruitment system into a new one because exclusivity of public 
employee system4 has been maintained for a long time through the fifth-level entry recruitment 
system. Nonetheless, this is a necessary step towards becoming a better government. Kim and 
Lee (2012) researched whether openness of public offices was related to efficiency and integrity 
of government among OECD countries. According to the research, countries with high degree of 
public office openness such as Denmark, New Zealand, Sweden, Australia, Netherland, Germany, 
Luxemburg, Japan, and France tend to have low degree of government corruption. 
The third problem in the Korea’s personnel management system is the excessive rotation of 
positions leading to low task continuity and work expertise. In brief, the position rotation is a 
system in which individual public officials move to different positions after spending certain 
period of time in one position to provide them with wide range of work experiences in various 
fields and to equip them with broad perspectives. Initially, this system was introduced as a 
measure to counter the illnesses of bureaucracy such as sectionalism and coalescence, but now it 
is being pointed out as the main factor that lowers competence and sense of responsibility of 
public officials. For instance, a former minister of the Ministry of Personnel Management, Lee 
Kun Myun, argued in a news interview in 2015 that “at the top of the public personnel 
management problem is the position rotation system. Irresponsibility and rigidity of public 
employees are all due to the position rotation system.5” Although the position rotation system 
was purported to accumulate various work-related experience, as long as the current system only 
rotate public officials within a single ministry, it is difficult to accomplish the initial purpose 
(Moon & Park, 2015). Moreover, since a position last only less than for two years, public 
officials are rotated to a different position as soon as they are accustomed to the last position. 
This significantly lowers work efficiencies and blocks any opportunity to actually use their 
expertise and skills that they have accumulated. 
The fourth personnel management problem is the ministry selfishness. Although inter-
ministerial cooperation has become important, more so than ever, in overcoming complex policy 
problems, the current personnel management system with very little mobility of public 
employees across different ministries cannot deal with the ministerial selfishness problem of 
public officials. There are numerous cases of inter-ministerial conflicts stranding reform policies 
or delaying urgent actions because public officials prioritize gains of their ministries over those 
of the nation and, ultimately, of the people. Also at times, through the regulatory and control 
centered administration, public officials bolster the power of their own ministries at the cost of 
public benefits and even guarantee positions for their superiors after their retirement. 
At its core, this is a personnel management problem. Rather than being judged based on 
objective performance assessments and achievements, personnel evaluations of public officials 
tend to be carried out arbitrary by superiors in their ministries. As a consequence, the system 
                                                            
4 Exclusivity in the recruitment of public official means “range of potential candidates who can be appointed to 
conduct particular high ranking positions and the more the range is limited to particular small groups of candidates, 
the more exclusive the public official recruitment system is” (Kim & Lee, 2012: 139). 
5 Naeil Shinmun (2015. 2. 3) 
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breeds tight-knit networks within the ministry members and favoritism towards its own ministry. 
Thus, there are many voices advocating the need to fix the extreme ministerial selfishness by 
improving the closed personnel management system of working within single ministry for entire 
duration of their careers toward the model of cross-ministerial position rotations.  
Finally, increasing political influence of bureaucrats are weakening political neutrality of 
public employees (Figure 2). Only when political neutrality of public employees is maintained, 
can the government regain trust of publics and protect medium- to long-term public interests 
while keeping consistency of policies (Moon & Park, 2015). Public officials can protect the 
public interests by remaining politically neutral. More specifically, Park (2011; 25) saw political 
neutrality of public employees as including “approaching the work from the public interest 
perspective.” Therefore, political neutrality of public employees in the long-term allows build-up 
of public’s trust in government workers that they are doing their duties as experts for the benefits 
of the public. In turn, the public’s trust that public officials are doing their tasks as administrative 
experts independent of political interests or influences is the sure-fire way of gaining public’s 
trust in the government itself. However, there are many cases where public officials undermine 
their political neutrality such as illegally intervening into election process of politicians (Park, 
2011), and, critically, even the reverse is true as there are also cases of political influence acting 
on personnel management matters concerning public officials (Park, 2011). This is forbidden by 
the current public employee laws. Hiring and promotion of public employees must strictly be 
based on achievements as well as fair standards and process, and those from spoils or patronage 
systems are prohibited (Park, 2011). Although this is the law, in reality, personnel managements 
of public officials are often determined by internal conflicts and politics within bureaucracy or 
by external political pressures rather than by individual competence or achievements due to the 
excessive position rotation and inadequate evaluations of public employee. Thus, to cut political 
ties and restore political neutrality of public officials, the introduction of adequate and objective 
evaluation will be the key factor.  
In the following chapter, we examine possible measures to deal with numerous problems of 
Korea’s public official personnel management system outlined above: rank and seniority systems 
problem, exclusivity in recruiting, excessive position rotation, extreme ministerial selfishness, 
and weakening political neutrality.  
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Figure 2. Results of the Survey on Public Office Culture: Political Influence 
 
 Highly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree 
Highly 
Agree 
Non-
Response t-test 
Difficult to 
Conduct 
Honest 
Administrative 
Works Due to 
Increasing 
Political 
Influences 
Public 
Employees 
1  
(0.4) 
26  
(10.4) 
58  
(23.2) 
117  
(46.8) 
47  
(18.8) 
1  
(0.4) 
-0.175
Experts 1 (0.4) 
16  
(6.4) 
25  
(10) 
102  
(40.8) 
106  
(42.4) 
0  
(0) 
Overall 2  (0.4) 
42  
(8.4) 
83  
(16.6) 
219  
(43.8) 
153  
(30.6) 
1  
(0.2) 500 
Sources: Moon and Park (2015: 156). 
 
 
3. 3C Strategies for Introducing New Talent Management System 
 
Problems in Korean public employee management system have serious repercussions including 
public office culture and environment lacking competitions and competencies, as well as pride 
and principles among public employees themselves, within public offices, and across public 
organizations as a whole. Once talented individuals are selected as public employees, due to the 
public office culture and environment lacking competitions, they no longer seek to improve their 
expertise and skills. Even when they have strong passion for self-improvement, they are often 
faced with institutional problems that hinder their efforts. Moreover, because they are not 
guaranteed political neutrality, there are side-effects of public employees having difficulties in 
finding pride and principles in their positions as government workers. Thus, to overcome these 
problems, we suggest introducing a new talent management system for Korea’s public officials 
through 3C strategies which are a) openness through competition, b) integrated specialty through 
competence, and c) political neutrality through confidence (Figure 3; Table 4). 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
Public Employee Experts Overall
Highly Disagree Disagree Neither
Agree Highly Agree Non‐Response
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Figure 3. 3C Strategies and Systemic Problems of Public Offices 
 
Competition  Openness 
   
Competence  Integrated Specialty 
   
Confidence  Political Neutrality 
 
 
Table 4. 3C Strategies and Its Implementation Details 
 
Strategies Implementation Details 
Competition > Openness - Expand entry-level recruitment system / 
reform seniority centered system / open 
public employee system 
- Improve personnel assignment management 
through continual expansion of position 
classification system 
- link strict and objective achievement and 
performance evaluation with position, 
promotion, and reward  
- provide fast-track promotion opportunities 
for talented public employees and dismiss 
ones that are incompetent 
Competence > Integrated Specialty - Improve the fifth-level entry recruitment 
system and expand capability centered 
recruitment 
- Improve career management and structure 
career paths going beyond the barriers 
between ministries 
- Internal reinforcement of capacity 
development 
Confidence > Political Neutrality - Strengthen educations inspiring pride and 
self-efficacy among public employees 
- Strengthen political neutrality of public 
employees and prevent politicization 
- Raise responsibility of high ranking 
government officials and increase their 
autonomy and roles to fulfill their 
responsibilities 
- Improve actual reward system for 
outstanding public employees  
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3.1. Opennessthrough Competition  
 
To improve the current rank and seniority systems in public offices, first, there need to be 
expansions in open recruitment system, and overall openness of the public offices also need to be 
raised by employing achievement and performance based system in place of rank and seniority 
systems. The most important form of open recruitment system is the experienced recruitment 
system. Using this system, public offices can select and place talented individuals by employing 
highly capable private sector experts. It is expected that opening the public offices to outsiders 
will bring competition to public offices and facilitate its adoption of a competition-centered 
system of personnel management. Likewise, by hiring experts from private sectors, problems of 
traditional seniority-based promotion system can be redressed, and new organizational cultures 
can be cultivated where new positions are assigned in accordance with career experience and 
expertise of individual public officials, and rewards are provided based on individual 
achievements and job performances. In fact, the former minister of the Ministry of Personnel 
Management, Lee Kun Myun, announced ‘plans to reinforce competence- and performance-
centered personnel management’ in October 2010. More specifically, in the promotion 
evaluation of public officials, the plan reduced proportion of the seneiority from 5-30% to 5-20% 
and raised those of performance assessment from 70-95% to 80-95%. This kind of change is 
aligned with a general reform across the public sector, and in actuality, OECD countries are 
indeed transforming towards placing greater emphasis on individual achievements and job 
performances in promotion and salary systems of public employees (OECD, 2012).  
Second, the current task classification system should be continuously strengthened, and task 
oriented personnel management should also be fostered. As a contrasting concept to the rank 
system of the traditional personnel management system, task classification system is a method of 
vertically and horizontally sorting task categories based on type of their difficulties by analyzing 
roles of ministries and positions (Choi, 2015). The task classification systems being employed in 
Korea include contract public employee system, position contest system, and experienced fifth-
level recruitment from the private sector. A common factor is that they were pushed forward to 
raise openness in public offices (Choi, 2015). The task classification system has contrasting 
characteristics to the rank system in terms of its recruitment, promotion-career management, 
evaluation-reward, and incentive perspectives (Table 5). In particular, with the task classification 
system, it would become feasible to recruit based on specific task expertise as well as to evaluate 
and reward based on merits, making it possible to reinforce specialty of public employees with 
focuses on performance and achievement. 
Third, public employees should be given appropriate position, promotion, and reward based 
on strict and objective performance evaluation and achievement management. Over the last 20 
years, OECD countries have been emphasizing raising efficiencies of government organizations 
to meet the complex and various roles demanded on governments. As such, each nation has been 
making efforts to develop and improve various achievement management systems, such as 
performance indicators, program evaluations, cost-benefit analyses, partial evaluations, and 
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expenditure evaluations, to advance job capabilities of public officials with accurate achievement 
management in its central government organizations (OECD, 2012). Each country is selecting 
and implementing measures that link transparent and accurate achievement evaluations of public 
officials with position, promotion, and reward systems (OECD, 2012). 
Fourth, in order to induce performance and achievement based competition, the government 
needs to expand its systems to provide ‘Fast-track’ promotions for talented public officials and, 
at the same time, weed out those who are incompetent. At present, public officials of Korea must 
spend set minimum years of service before they can be promoted (Seo, 2012). More specifically, 
current types of promotions can be divided into three, which are regular, tenured, and special 
promotions. Considering that employees are eligible for the regular and tenured promotions after 
satisfying a set years of service, the rank and tenure rather than achievements and job 
performances become more important factors in the current promotion system. Therefore, it is a 
challenge for public officials to self-motivate themselves to outperform in their tasks or to 
develop expertise under this system, indicating that to rectify the problems, there need to be 
active adoption of performance- and achievement-based promotion and dismissal system. A 
foundation for this system already exists. In line with these policy intentions, the former minister 
of the Ministry of Personnel Management, Lee Kun Myun, announced the plans to facilitate 
special promotions for high performers in June 2015. This system was an extension to the 
expansion of recruitments of private sector experts and to the introduction of ‘Fast-track’ to raise 
job performances and competence of public officials. Before the ‘Fast-track’, it took 20-25 years 
for a ninth-level public official to reach the fifth-level, but with the plans to facilitate special 
promotions for high performers, it is now possible for ninth-level public officials to reach fifth-
level even within 10 years. With the introduction of the ‘Fast-track’ system, each ministry could 
determine its own proportion of special promotion and method in accordance with its own 
circumstance, and the central government only needs to support and monitor each ministry to 
ensure that the system is operated as initially intended.6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
6 The Ministry of Personnel Management homepage. 
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Table 5. Comparisons Between Rank and Task Classification Systems 
 
  Rank System Task Classification System 
Recruitment 
Human Capital 
Acquisition Recruit per ranks Recruit per tasks 
Requirement 
- General abilities 
- Prefer young people with high 
potentials 
- Particular task specialty 
Promotion and 
Career 
management 
Route to 
Promotion exclusive 
Emphasize openness (in- and 
outside of public offices) 
Transfer of 
Personnel 
Consider flexibility as a position 
rotation system 
Long-term career at specific 
tasks in charge 
Training and 
Education 
In general, they are conducted 
when there are hiring or 
promotions for each rank 
Conducted as needed for each 
position 
Career 
Development 
Stresses wide range of 
experiences of general 
administrators 
Stresses experiences in specialty 
areas 
- Priority is in developing 
management capabilities 
- In the field, it emphasizes 
development of specialty 
- Priority is in developing task 
skills 
- The need for developing 
management capabilities 
depends on career development 
system 
Evaluations 
and Rewards 
Measure 
Performance Difficult to measure Easy to measure 
Performance 
Criteria 
Seniority/Rank/Ability 
(potential capabilities as 
expressed by ranks) 
- difficulty and responsibilities 
of tasks 
- merit based (achieved results) 
Setting 
Rewards 
Pay grade based on ranks 
(emphasize living wage and 
seniority-based pay) 
Centered around position- and 
performance-based pays 
Points of Emphasis in Internal 
Motivations of Personnel 
Management 
Immersed in organizations Immersed in tasks 
Source: Choi (2015; 28) 
 
 
3.2. Integrated Specialty through Competence 
 
For competence to become the standard in recruiting and managing public officials, the entry-
level recruitment system, first and foremost, needs to be transformed to rely on capacity-based 
criteria in its recruitment process. Since the current entry-level recruitment system is judged to 
be fair and is conducted and managed objectively by the central government, it still has the 
advantage in terms of giving fair and equal chances to everybody. However, the down-side is 
that it is not well suited for discovering talented individuals with specialized sets of skills for 
given government positions due to its heavy reliance on paper and pencil exams (Moon & Park, 
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2015). Therefore, the entry-level recruitment system needs to incorporate, at least partially, some 
elements of qualitative assessments to address short-comings of the current system based on the 
quantitative assessment. For instance, skills and general competence required of public officials 
in the long-term such as basic behavioral capacity, job performance competence, and 
managementand social skills must be assessed multi-dimensionally and comprehensively using 
various tests already being employed in the private sector such as blind tests, problem solving 
projects, role playing, and interview camps (Moon & Park, 2015). 
Second, measures to abolish the current fifth-level entry recruitment system should be 
pursued, and in its place, sixth level public employees should be hired as a priority and 
selectively promoted instead to the fifth level using the fast-track system. Although many new 
talented individuals are being recruited through the fifth-level entry system, there are also cases 
where the fifth-level employees do not show particularly strong achievements or performances 
when they are actually working in their ministries. In contrast, there have been cases of public 
officials hired as seventh-level performing well above their level in actual duties. As such, there 
should be considerations to switch the current fifth-level entry recruitment system to one that 
recruits sixth-level public officials instead, and also let the sixth-level employees compete with 
those who are hired as seventh-level for the fifth-level position based on job performances and 
achievements. The major advantage expected with this system is that that the seventh-level 
employees will have access to the fast-track promotion while the fifth-level positions could be 
assigned to appropriate personnel based on assessments of task-related competence. 
Third, career management system must be improved, and career paths that go beyond inter-
ministerial barriers must be structured. As an example, consider the story of King Sejong the 
Great. Despite the strictly class-based society of the period, he carried out unprecedented reform 
of the personnel management system in which he appointed workers based on their expertise. It 
is no wonder that ruling under the King Sejong the Great was the most peaceful period within the 
Joseon Dynasty era as he was able to develop science and agricultural technologies of the Joseon 
Dynasty by discovering new talents like Jang Yeong-sil. Considering the closed and rigid 
personnel management system of today’s Korean government, the works of King Sejong provide 
important lessons to be learned. In order to succeed this spirit and implement expertise based 
personnel management, the current position rotation system need to be improved such that 
transfers are restricted by enforcing minimum service of three years per position assigned, and a 
matrix personnel management system should be introduced, which conducts assessment and 
management of positions according to type of tasks carried out. Since the current position 
rotation system changes positions in less a year on average, it is difficult for public officials to 
accumulate expertise and sense of responsibilities with regards to given tasks. Thus, there needs 
to be an incentive system, such as career, pay, and promotion benefits, so that public officials are 
encouraged to accumulate experiences and become competent workers. 
Likewise, there is a need to implement a career management system going beyond inter-
ministerial barriers. A number of prior researches on this topic also emphasizes the need for 
flexible career management to overcome the inter-ministerial boundaries (Choi, 2003; Nam & 
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Ryu, 2004; Kim, 2008). To this end, authors of this paper suggest introduction of ‘I-type career 
system. In brief, in this system, new public officials work in at least three ministries for at least 
three years each for the total of 15 years until they reach the section chief position. Then, they 
continue to work in one ministry until they are promoted to become high ranking officers, at 
which point they can again rotate across ministries. 
Fourth, education and training for public officials should be strengthened. According to the 
survey conducted by the KDI in 2015, the current educations for public employees are centered 
on providing large amount of knowledge at once, meaning that there are only few debate- or 
problem solving-based education (Moon & Park, 2015). However, this is a serious misstep in the 
today’s world. Fullan and Langworthy (2014) argued that 21 century talents require creativity, 
critical thinking and problem solving, collaboration, communication, character, and citizenship 
or 6Cs, and these traditional ways of teaching public officials are not appropriate for cultivating 
the 6Cs at all. Therefore, the current education and training system of public officials should 
incorporate more debate project, and learning by doing so that it moves towards the direction 
where individual public officials can develop appropriate skills and competencies that they can 
actually relate to their daily tasks.  
 
3.3. Political Neutrality Through Confidence 
 
To establish public office culture that enables public officials themselves to cultivate their own 
pride and principles regarding public offices, first, there should be more educations intended for 
inspiring pride and self-efficacy in public officials. It is well established in empirical researches 
that public officials’ self-efficacy and pride in self raise their job engagement and organizational 
commitment (Hong, 2008; Song, 2012). Likewise, having pride in working in public posts as 
public officials or having confidence in one’s ability and efficacy can have positive impacts, 
leading to greater job performances in actual tasks. For instance, in a survey conducted for 
Korean public officials in 2013 revealed that the most important reasons for becoming public 
officials were guaranteed job position and stable economic life of public officials.7 In other 
words, they lack sense of duty and identity as public officials when they engage in public 
services. In addition, according to the survey conducted by the Ministry of Personnel 
Management in 2015, 53.2% of public officials participated answered that ‘improvement in pride 
and morale of public officials’ is the most urgent priority in innovating public offices.8 This 
reflects the fact that it is not just outsiders, but public officials themselves also feel negatively 
about themselves and are losing their pride as public officials, indicating the urgent need for 
solutions. 
Second, political neutrality of public officials should be reinforced and politicization of 
public officials should be prevented. Since the formation of modern states, public officials have 
                                                            
7 It refers to the survey conducted by Korea Institute of Public Administration in April 2013 on central and local 
government public officials across the nation. Results of the survey is published as a report titled “Survey on Public 
Officials’ Perception of Administration.” 
8 Public Official U Newspaper (2015. 01. 19). 
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been able to devote themselves to public services because they were guaranteed of their positions 
through political neutrality. Han (2016), for instance, classified politicization of bureaucracy into 
two concepts, politicization as a power and politicization as a tool, and from these, he suggested 
responsiveness and professionalism as the concepts constituting political neutrality. According to 
these conceptualizations, the process of protecting political neutrality for public officials can be 
seen as improving expertise regarding their works and securing responsiveness as administrative 
government under representative democracy. Thus, politicization of public employees needs to 
be prevented through political neutrality of public officials by private firmly establishing fairness 
and trustworthiness as their core values.  
Third, higher responsibilities and autonomies of high ranking public officials are important to 
hold them accountable. High ranking officials take key responsibilities in supporting the 
president or ministers. In addition, they are also in charge of suggesting directions to lower level 
public officials and putting actual efforts in achieving policy targets and results. In recent years, 
however, large number of public officials think that a lot of changes have occurred regarding the 
relationship between authorities and responsibilities of public officials. For example, according 
to a survey on 230 public officials conducted by a newspaper agency in 2015, 189 respondents 
(93%) answered to the questionnaire “how is the authority of public officials now compared to 
the past?” that it has declined a bit at the least.9 This may actually be a positive result reflecting 
the fact that the authorities of public officials have indeed declined in comparison to those in the 
past and that the mechanism put in place to check and monitor abuse of authorities is working as 
intended. On the other hand, however, negative aspects could also be seen from this result in that 
public officials are influenced too much by the political pressures rather than autonomously 
making decisions based on their principles. Therefore, while it is necessary to keep the checking 
and monitoring mechanisms for preventing excessive abuse of power, the public officials should 
also be granted more autonomies and discretionary powers to fulfill their work responsibilities 
and to maintain political neutrality. 
Fourth, the reward system for outstanding public officials needs to be improved. Choi (2009), 
for example, emphasized that in order to raise openness of public offices, the current reward 
system should be reformed towards one that is based on performance, competence, and job 
responsibility. Singapore, which is well-known for high competence and integrity of its public 
officials, select and train exceptional individuals as public officials even from high school or 
universities and provide them with high salary in accordance with their abilities as well as 
opportunities for fast promotions. At the same time, Singaporean performance-based pay system 
has shown cases of low salaries or even dismissals for low performing public employees. Korea, 
likewise, needs to renovate its reward system to link achievements and performances with 
salaries and promotions to provide effective incentives. The politicization of public official can 
be removed in Korea only when the reward system is reformed in this way. 
  
 
                                                            
9 Chosun Biz (2015. 08. 17) 
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IV. Three Reforms to Introduce a New Talent Management System for Korea’s Public 
Officials 
 
This chapter provides detailed discussions about three reforms under 3C strategies in order to 
introduce the new talent management system of Korea’s public officials. The three reforms are 
as follows: a) abolishment of the entry-level recruitment at the fifth-level, b) abolishment of the 
career path in which most public officials serve for a single ministry throughout their career, and 
c) introduction of the matrix personnel management system that combines the vertical and 
horizontal managements. 
 
4.1. Abolishment of the Entry-Level Recruitment at the Fifth-Level 
 
The most common method of recruitment for new public officials currently is the entry level 
recruitment in which all those who meet the eligibility requirements have the opportunity to 
apply and be selected through examinations. Unless there are other special reasons, in principle, 
new public officials should be recruited through the entry-level recruitment process in Korea (Oh, 
2005). However, with the advent of knowledge economy, diversified and complex administration, 
and various perspectives on the definition of a talented person, traditional public employee 
personnel management has been shaking. More specifically, the entry-level recruitment system 
based on one-size-fits-all type of examinations is being criticized heavily. 
 The problems in the current recruitment system can be divided into two parts. The first 
problem is the low relevancy of higher education for the examination. In fact, many test-takers 
point out that university lectures have no use in preparing for the entry-level recruitment 
examination, and some students even decide to drop out of universities to prepare for the entry-
level recruitment exam. Furthermore, there is also the concern that the examination itself is not 
really useful in measuring the skills emphasized in today’s public sectors such as communication 
and collaboration skills. For example, the current English test in the entry level recruitment 
examination is based on rote learning and memorization. As a result, it is difficult to evaluate 
practical language skills. In addition, there is a question of low validity in selection of test 
subjects. At present, four and five subjects are examined for the first and second tests during the 
fifth-level entry recruitment process, respectively. As for the seventh- and ninth-level entry 
recruitment examinations, applicants are tested seven and five subjects, respectively. However, 
because each subject has low linkage to each other and because there are many unnecessary 
subjects, very heavy burden is placed on test-takers. Furthermore, there are gaps between 
subjects tested and actual skills and knowledge used at work after passing the exam. 
 To overcome these weaknesses and to recruit as well as to train outstanding public 
employees who are ready for the current administrative environment, construction of recruitment 
and assessment systems in the long-term perspectives is required rather than short-term 
assessment based on exams. Two possible alternatives to the current system are presented. 
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First of all, the plan A is a more gradual approach to the plan B. It involves hiring new 
recruits who have passed the fifth-level entry examinations and finished new trainee program as 
sixth-, rather than fifth-, level public officials and place them in local governments or in front-
line of administrative fields. Once there, new recruits will first accumulate work experiences for 
three to five years as sixth-level public officials. Then after a performance assessment, those with 
high competence will be promoted to the fifth-level deputy director and guided towards a track 
in which they can become a section chief after 15 more years of service. Thereafter, they can 
even be promoted to high ranking officials depending on their capabilities, and once they reach 
that point, they may be allowed to work in various ministries. 
In this way, new high-level recruits can have the opportunity to effectively see and 
understand processes taking place in the fields and have better learning experiences than those 
who undergo general trainee programs. Furthermore, by employing a performance-based 
competition between new recruits, excellent workers could be promoted through the fast-track 
while those who are under performing could be restricted of promotions. Using this approach, it 
will be possible to encourage achievement motivations of individuals and build positive 
competitive environment from the organizational perspective. Since years in service become 
longer with this plan, the old problem of early retirement is rectified while at the same time, it 
has the advantage of being able to promote talented employees with practical work skills.  
 In contrast, the plan B is a more drastic reform involving integration of entry level 
recruitments for fifth- and seventh-level public officials. More specifically, the plan involves, 
first, integrating the currently separate fifth- and seventh-level recruitment system into one and, 
as in the previous plan A, have the new recruits work temporarily for three to five years. Here, it 
is important to design a system where these recruits can accumulate and go through various 
front-line administrative work experiences. Those who set distinguishing achievements and 
performances in that period should compete with each other and be promoted to fifth-level 
deputy director position and then to the section chief position after another 15 years of service. 
From then on, as in the plan A, depending on their competence, they could move forward as high 
ranking officials. In comparison, for those who did not show the capacity, they could be directed 
to a path similar to the one that is set for the current seventh-level public officials. Additionally, 
there could also be a consideration of giving the freedom to choose a ministry of preferences to 
those who achieved outstanding results during the first three- to five-year period of experiences 
in local governments and ministry administrations. The major difference compared with the 
existing system lies in the fact that there is competition and competence development aspects to 
the new system. 
 The critical rationale behind the plan B is that unlike in the past, majority of people who are 
currently applying for the entry level recruitment examinations have at least bachelor’s degree or 
more and generally show similar level of capabilities. In particular, due to the chronic 
unemployment problem, large portion of capable talents with higher education actually apply for 
the seventh-level entry recruitment examination. As a result, competency of seventh level 
applicants have gone up drastically and their work performances are, in fact, comparable to those 
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of public officials recruited through the fifth-level entry process, indicating that the recruitment 
system of distinguishing the fifth- and seventh-level entries is gradually losing its effectiveness. 
Thus, considering the minimal ability differences between the fifth- and seventh-level new 
recruits and the need to breakaway with structure problem of fifth-level entry recruits 
monopolizing high ranking positions, this new recruitment system of combining fifth- and 
seventh-level entry recruitment systems can be a promising alternative to the current system. 
 Although pros and cons between the plan A and B should be analyzed in more detail in 
the future, given that the plan A is more gradual transformation, a stepped approach could be 
suggested in which the plan A is implemented first, and then, depending on its result, the new 
system could incorporate the plan B.  
 
4.2. Abolishment of the Career Path in Which Most Public Officials Serve for a Single Ministry 
Throughout Their Career 
 
For practical implementation of personnel management reform of public officials, continued 
management of existing pool of human resources is just as important as recruiting new personnel 
and developing suitable training environments. Above all, to resolve the ministerial selfishness at 
the state of crisis, the career path in which most public officials serve for a single ministry 
throughout their career must be abolished.  
First option that can be considered is the I-type career system (Figure 4). This involves 
structuring the career path so that new recruits work for about 15 years in at least three different 
ministries for over three years each until they become a section chief. Then, they can work in one 
ministry till they promote to high ranking public officials at which point they can again rotate 
around ministries.10 Once public officials become high ranking officials, they can play critical 
roles in policy decision-making and management in number of ministries, allowing them to 
utilize their expertise, sense of political affairs, and leadership in holistic way.  
Another alternative is the introduction of the Y-type career system, which was proposed by 
Kim and Shin (2009) and was once pushed forward by the formal minister of the Ministry of 
Personnel Management, Lee Gyun-myun, (Figure 4). This is targeted for public officials with 10 
or more years of experience. Starting from the fourth-level position, Y-type career system can be 
employed in dual tracks as policy management officials and specialist officials. For the policy 
manager track, public officials for this track will be selected from seven task categories. Upon 
entrance, they may be given tasks for various ministries and be given incentives for high ranking 
positions down the line. As for the specialist track, public officials in this path would be 
promoted or transferred within the 30 categories of more specific tasks. Moreover, they will be 
encouraged to gain specialized knowledge and work skills in their particular areas of expertise 
and will be rewarded based on their work performance. Through this system, both policy 
management and specialist officials can move freely within the boundaries of their categories 
                                                            
10 We suggest 15 years in the I-type career system because it takes about 15 years on average to move from a fifth-
level recruit to a section chief. 
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across ministries as required, overcoming the problems of old position rotation system11 and 
enhancing task expertise. 
 
Figure 4. Suggestions to Improve the Position Rotation System. 
 
I-Type System Y-Type System 
 
Comparing these two alternatives, the I-type career system has a clear advantage in that it can 
be applied to new recruits when it first begins, minimizing resistance upon introduction. 
Conversely, the Y-type has a potential side-effect of overcrowding policy management track 
which could appear easier to be promoted. In particular, while the policy management track has 
the incentive of high ranking public official position, it is difficult to setup an equivalent 
incentive for the specialist track. As such, the I-type career system is most likely more 
appropriate choice since it can also secure specialists through open recruitment without 
providing a separate specialist track as in the Y-type approach. One example of the open 
recruitment can be utilization of government-funded research institutions. As it is now, 
researchers who are part of the economic, humanities, and social science research in the 
government-funded research institutes tend to show low morale and autonomy because they are 
being ordered and controlled unilaterally by public officials in central government. Conversely, 
because public officials in the central government rely unilaterally on the government funded 
research institutions, they are not accumulating their own expertise. Thus, as a solution to this 
problem, promoting active personnel exchange programs between central government and 
government-funded research institutions could foster competency of both public officials and 
researchers. Another form of open recruitment can be inviting outside experts per project or 
mission for 4- to 5-year term and providing salaries that match those from private sectors.  
 
                                                            
11 In the case of Korea, because of excessive position rotation, average term for section chiefs and higher last less 
than a year. This is severe short of optimal three years to comprehend missions of particular position and to build 
social network (third- to fifth-level: 34.4 monthes; less than sixth-level: 39.2 months; Kim, 2008). 
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4.3 Introduction of the Matrix Personnel Management System with Both Vertical and Horizontal 
Assessment and Promotion 
 
In contrast to the past, today’s administrative demand has become more complex and multi-
dimensional, and there are more policy dilemmas requiring inter-ministerial cooperation. As 
such, public officials with well-rounded skills are high in demand. To deliver this administrative 
demand of the era, a drastic reform of system a matrix personnel management system should be 
introduced in order to reinforce competition among public officials based on competence and 
confidence.  
First, the matrix system is based on limiting rotation of personnel by requiring at least three 
years of service in one position so that assessment and promotion for public officials could be 
based on the performance at the task that last long enough to be evaluated. More specifically, the 
assessment and promotion system under the four task categories will include both vertical and 
horizontal dimensions in the matrix system. In the vertical dimension, all public officials will be 
assessed by their superiors or colleagues within their ministries as was done traditionally. 
However, from the horizontal aspect, they will also be assessed at the same time by independent 
and external personnel management committee (or a minister-level organization under the prime 
minister’s office). In other words, daily routines of public officials will be under the superiors of 
the ministry, but personnel management will be jointly conducted by independent personnel 
management committee that responsible for a specific task category and ministry superiors as in 
matrix-like system. 
The deciding authority over personnel matters will lie in either the independent personnel 
management committee or in the chief of the policy planning department under the prime 
minister’s office (minister-level) who receives recommendations by each minister of respective 
ministry. The matrix personnel management goes beyond the wall of each ministry by assessing 
public officials objectively against those in comparable task categories in addition to the 
personnel management conducted behind the closed doors of each ministry. It is expected that 
this kind of matrix system will not only resolve the ministerial selfishness of public officials but 
will also boost their political neutrality. Importantly, introduction of the matrix system will 
facilitate construction of a system that is based on competition with continuous accumulation and 
uses of objective data and evidence on competence and confidence of public officials. This could 
be complemented with a reward system of granting preferential priority over choices of 
ministries and positions for those who perform exceptionally in the objective matrix assessment 
system, giving much more fair incentives to public officials. 
Discussing about the task category in more detail, in the past, seven task category matrix 
system for public officials were proposed (Shin & Kim, 2009: 214). Shin and Kim pointed out 
that existing categorization system is inadequate to guarantee expertise of public officials. They 
instead suggested 7 task categories which are a) general administration, b) industry and IT, c) 
diplomacy and national defense, d) land and environment, e) finance and economy, f) social 
welfare, and g) science, technology, and education. Based on these task categories, they 
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suggested that rotating public officials across ministries within given task category (Shin & Kim, 
2008: 216). This system has advantages of being able to raise expertise of each task category and 
to oversee the personnel management reform across government structure in general.  
Despite the advantages, however, it still is not sufficient to deal with the deep-seated social 
network formed by public officials in certain task categories coming from the existing fifth-level 
entry recruitment system. For example, the finance and economy category is already established 
as the ‘elite career’ within public officials recruited through the fifth-level entry process. Thus, 
there is a danger that there will remain closed exclusive social network if the finance and 
economy is kept as a separate category. As such, there is need to further reduce the seven task 
category system by eliminating its redundancy as well as improving linkage and efficiency of 
related tasks.  Suggested here is a four task category system, which divides the category into a) 
general administration (e.g., the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Public Safety and Security, 
the Office for Government Policy Coordination, and the Ministry of Personnel Management); b) 
finance, economy, land, and environment (e.g., the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, the 
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, the Ministry of Environment); c) international 
relations and national defense (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National 
Defense); d) society, education, and culture (e.g., the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of 
Culture, Sports, and Tourism, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare).  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This paper evaluated problems in personnel management system of public officials in relation to 
the changing administrative environment. Based on the assessments, a new talent management 
system for Korea’s public officials was suggested to enable public officials to fulfill their 
mission as administrative experts. 
Successful introduction of the new talent management system depends on the execution of 
the 3C strategy. Only through the strategies reinforcing competition, competence, and confidence, 
numerous problems including rank and seniority problem, closed recruitment of public officials, 
excessive rotation of positions, extreme ministerial selfishness, and weakening political 
neutrality of public officials, can be resolved. 
In executing the 3C strategy, it was suggested in detail that three key reforms must be made 
happen. The first reform is the abolishment of entry level recruitment system at the fifth level. 
The second reform is the abolishment of the career path in which most public officials serve for a 
single ministry for entire duration of their career. The third reform is the introduction of the 
matrix-type personnel management system. Although each of the three reforms is a fundamental 
and drastic reform on its own, without implementing these reforms, it will be very difficult to 
address the highly complex and immense socioeconomic issues that Korea faces today. It is 
hoped that this paper would incite further in-depth public discussions and follow-up papers. 
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Working
Paper 02-01 Sangmoon Hahm
Restructuring of the Public Enterprise after the Crisis:
The Case of Deposit Insurance Fund
Working
Paper 02-02 Kyong-Dong KIM
The Culture of Industrial Relations in Korea:
An alternative Sociological Approach
Working
Paper 02-03 Dukgeun Ahn Korean Experience of the Dispute Settlement in the world Trading System
Working
Paper 02-04
BERNARD S. BLACK
Hasung Jang
Woochan Kim
Does Corporate Governance Matter? (Evidence from the Korean Market)
Working
Paper 02-05
Sunwoong Kim
Ju-Ho Lee Secondary School Equalization Policies in South Korea
Working
Paper 02-06 Yoon-Ha YOO Penalty for Mismatch Between Ability and Quality, and School Choice
Working
Paper 02-07
Dukgeun Ahn
Han-Young Lie
Legal Issues of Privatization in Government Procurement Agreements: Experience of
Korea from Bilateral and WTO Agreements
Working
Paper 02-08
David J. Behling
Kyong Shik Eom U.S. Mortgage Markets and Institutions and Their Relevance for Korea
Working
Paper 03-01 Sang-Moon Hahm Transmission of Stock Returns and Volatility: the Case of Korea
Working
Paper 03-02 Yoon Ha Yoo Does Evidentiary Uncertainty Induce Excessive Injurer Care?
Working
Paper 03-03 Yoon Ha Yoo Competition to Enter a Better School and Private Tutoring
Working
Paper 03-04
Sunwoong Kim
Ju-Ho Lee Hierarchy and Market Competition in South Korea's Higher Education Sector
Working
Paper 03-05 Chul Chung Factor Content of Trade: Nonhomothetic Preferences and "Missing Trade"
Working
Paper 03-06 Hun Joo Park RECASTING KOREAN DIRIGISME
Working
Paper 03-07
Taejong Kim
Ju-Ho Lee
Young Lee
Mixing versus  Sorting in Schooling:
Evidence from the Equalization Policy in South Korea
Working
Paper 03-08 Naohito Abe
Managerial Incentive Mechanisms and Turnover of Company Presidents and Directors
in Japan
Working
Paper 03-09
Naohito Abe
Noel Gaston
Katsuyuki Kubo
EXECUTIVE PAY IN JAPAN: THE ROLE OF BANK-APPOINTED MONITORS
AND THE MAIN BANK RELATIONSHIP
Working
Paper 03-10 Chai-On Lee Foreign Exchange Rates Determination in the light of Marx's Labor-Value Theory
Working
Paper 03-11 Taejong Kim Political Economy and Population Growth in Early Modern Japan
Working
Paper 03-12
Il-Horn Hann
Kai-Lung Hui
Tom S. Lee
I.P.L. Png
Direct Marketing: Privacy and Competition
Working
Paper 03-13 Marcus Noland RELIGION, CULTURE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Working
Paper 04-01
Takao Kato
Woochan Kim
Ju Ho Lee
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN KOREA
Working
Paper 04-02 Kyoung-Dong Kim Korean Modernization Revisited: An Alternative View from the Other Side of History
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Working
Paper 04-03 Lee Seok Hwang Ultimate Ownership, Income Management, and Legal and Extra-Legal Institutions
Working
Paper 04-04 Dongsoo Kang
Key Success Factors in the Revitalization of Distressed Firms:
A Case of the Korean Corporate Workouts
Working
Paper 04-05
Il Chong Nam
Woochan Kim
Corporate Governance of Newly Privatized Firms:
The Remaining Issues in Korea
Working
Paper 04-06
Hee Soo Chung
Jeong Ho Kim
Hyuk Il Kwon
Housing Speculation and Housing Price Bubble in Korea
Working
Paper 04-07 Yoon-Ha Yoo Uncertainty and Negligence Rules
Working
Paper 04-08 Young Ki Lee Pension and Retirement Fund Management
Working
Paper 04-09
Wooheon Rhee
Tack Yun Implications of Quasi-Geometric Discountingon the Observable Sharp e Ratio
Working
Paper 04-10 Seung-Joo Lee Growth Strategy: A Conceptual Framework
Working
Paper 04-11
Boon-Young Lee
Seung-Joo Lee Case Study of Samsung’s Mobile Phone Business
Working
Paper 04-12
Sung Yeung Kwack
Young Sun Lee What Determines Saving Rate in Korea?: the Role of Demography
Working
Paper 04-13 Ki-Eun Rhee Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Externalities
Working
Paper 04-14
Jaeun Shin
Sangho Moon
IMPACT OF DUAL ELIGIBILITY ON HEALTHCARE USE BY MEDICARE
BENEFICIARIES
Working
Paper 04-15
Hun Joo Park
Yeun-Sook Park
Riding into the Sunset: The Political Economy of Bicycles as a Declining Industry in
Korea
Working
Paper 04-16
Woochan Kim
Hasung Jang
Bernard S. Black
Predicting Firm's Corporate Governance Choices: Evidence from Korea
Working
Paper 04-17 Tae Hee Choi Characteristics of Firms that Persistently Meet or Beat Analysts' Forecasts
Working
Paper 04-18
Taejong Kim
Yoichi Okita
Is There a Premium for Elite College Education:
Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Japan
Working
Paper 04-19
Leonard K. Cheng
Jae Nahm Product Boundary, Vertical Competition, and the Double Mark-up Problem
Working
Paper 04-20
Woochan Kim
Young-Jae Lim
Taeyoon Sung
What Determines the Ownership Structure of Business Conglomerates?:
On the Cash Flow Rights of Korea’s Chaebol
Working
Paper 04-21 Taejong Kim Shadow Education: School Quality and Demand for Private Tutoring in Korea
Working
Paper 04-22
Ki-Eun Rhee
Raphael Thomadsen Costly Collusion in Differentiated Industries
Working
Paper 04-23
Jaeun Shin
Sangho Moon HMO plans, Self-selection, and Utilization of Health Care Services
Working
Paper 04-24 Yoon-Ha Yoo Risk Aversion and Incentive to Abide By Legal Rules
Working
Paper 04-25 Ji Hong Kim Speculative Attack and Korean Exchange Rate Regime
Working
Paper 05-01
Woochan Kim
Taeyoon Sung What Makes Firms Manage FX Risk? : Evidence from an Emerging Market
Working
Paper 05-02
Janghyuk Lee
Laoucine Kerbache Internet Media Planning: An Optimization Model
Working
Paper 05-03 Kun-Ho Lee Risk in the Credit Card Industry When Consumer Types are Not Observable
Working
Paper 05-04 Kyong-Dong KIM Why Korea Is So Prone To Conflict: An Alternative Sociological Analysis
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Working
Paper 05-05 Dukgeun AHN Why Should Non-actionable Subsidy Be Non-actionable?
Working
Paper 05-06 Seung-Joo LEE Case Study of L’Oréal: Innovation and Growth Strategy
Working
Paper 05-07 Seung-Joo LEE Case Study of BMW: The Ultimate Driving Machine
Working
Paper 05-08 Taejong KIM Do School Ties Matter? Evidence from the Promotion of Public Prosecutors in Korea
Working
Paper 05-09 Hun Joo PARK
Paradigms and Fallacies:
Rethinking Northeast Asian Security
Working
Paper 05-10
WOOCHAN KIM
TAEYOON SUNG What Makes Group-Affiliated Firms Go Public?
Working
Paper 05-11
BERNARD S. BLACK
WOOCHAN KIM
HASUNG JANG
KYUNG-SUH PARK
Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms' Market Values?
Time Series Evidence from Korea
Working
Paper 05-12 Kun-Ho Lee
Estimating Probability of Default For the Foundation IRB Approach In Countries That
Had Experienced Extreme Credit Crises
Working
Paper 05-13 Ji-Hong KIM Optimal Policy Response To Speculative Attack
Working
Paper 05-14
Kwon Jung
Boon Young Lee
Coupon Redemption Behaviors among Korean Consumers: Effects of Distribution
Method, Face Value, and Benefits on Coupon Redemption Rates in Service Sector
Working
Paper 06-01
Kee-Hong Bae
Seung-Bo Kim
Woochan Kim
Family Control and Expropriation of Not-for-Profit Organizations:
Evidence from Korean Private Universities
Working
Paper 06-02 Jaeun Shin
How Good is Korean Health Care?
An International Comparison of Health Care Systems
Working
Paper 06-03 Tae Hee Choi Timeliness of Asset Write-offs
Working
Paper 06-04 Jin PARK
Conflict Resolution Case Study:
The National Education Information System (NEIS)
Working
Paper 06-05 YuSang CHANG
DYNAMIC COMPETITIVE PARADIGM OF MANAGING MOVING TARGETS;
IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREAN INDUSTY
Working
Paper 06-06 Jin PARK A Tale of Two Government Reforms in Korea
Working
Paper 06-07 Ilho YOO Fiscal Balance Forecast of Cambodia 2007-2011
Working
Paper 06-08 Ilho YOO PAYG pension in a small open economy
Working
Paper 06-09
Kwon JUNG
Clement LIM IMPULSE BUYING BEHAVIORS ON THE INTERNET
Working
Paper 06-10 Joong H. HAN Liquidation Value and Debt Availability: An Empirical Investigation
Working
Paper 06-11
Brandon Julio, Woojin Kim
Michael S. Weisbach
Uses of Funds and the Sources of Financing:
Corporate Investment and Debt Contract Design
Working
Paper 06-12 Hun Joo Park
Toward People-centered Development:
A Reflection on the Korean Experience
Working
Paper 06-13 Hun Joo Park The Perspective of Small Business in South Korea
Working
Paper 06-14 Younguck KANG Collective Experience and Civil Society in Governance
Working
Paper 06-15 Dong-Young KIM
The Roles of Government Officials as Policy Entrepreneurs
in Consensus Building Process
Working
Paper 06-16 Ji Hong KIM Military Service : draft or recruit
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Working
Paper 06-17 Ji Hong KIM Korea-US FTA
Working
Paper 06-18 Ki-Eun RHEE Reevaluating Merger Guidelines for the New Economy
Working
Paper 06-19
Taejong KIM
Ji-Hong KIM
Insook LEE
Economic Assimilation of North Korean Refugees in South Korea: Survey Evidence
Working
Paper 06-20 Seong Ho CHO
ON THE STOCK RETURN METHOD TO DETERMINING INDUSTRY
SUBSTRUCTURE: AIRLINE, BANKING, AND OIL INDUSTRIES
Working
Paper 06-21 Seong Ho CHO
DETECTING INDUSTRY SUBSTRUCTURE:
- Case of Banking, Steel and Pharmaceutical Industries-
Working
Paper 06-22 Tae Hee Choi
Ethical Commitment, Corporate Financial Factors: A Survey Study of Korean
Companies
Working
Paper 06-23 Tae Hee Choi Aggregation, Uncertainty, and Discriminant Analysis
Working
Paper 07-01
Jin PARK
Seung-Ho JUNG
Ten Years of Economic Knowledge Cooperation
with North Korea: Trends and Strategies
Working
Paper 07-02
BERNARD S. BLACK
WOOCHAN KIM
The Effect of Board Structure on Firm Value in an Emerging Market:
IV, DiD, and Time Series Evidence from Korea
Working
Paper 07-03 Jong Bum KIM
FTA Trade in Goods Agreements:
‘Entrenching’ the benefits of reciprocal tariff concessions
Working
Paper 07-04 Ki-Eun Rhee Price Effects of Entries
Working
Paper 07-05 Tae H. Choi Economic Crises and the Evolution of Business Ethics in Japan and Korea
Working
Paper 07-06
Kwon JUNG
Leslie TEY
Extending the Fit Hypothesis in Brand Extensions:
Effects of Situational Involvement, Consumer Innovativeness and Extension
Incongruity on Evaluation of Brand Extensions
Working
Paper 07-07 Younguck KANG
Identifying the Potential Influences on Income Inequality Changes in Korea – Income
Factor Source Analysis
Working
Paper 07-08
WOOCHAN KIM
TAEYOON SUNG
SHANG-JIN WEI
Home-country Ownership Structure of Foreign Institutional Investors and Control-
Ownership Disparity in Emerging Markets
Working
Paper 07-09 Ilho YOO The Marginal Effective Tax Rates in Korea for 45 Years : 1960-2004
Working
Paper 07-10 Jin PARK Crisis Management for Emergency in North Korea
Working
Paper 07-11 Ji Hong KIM Three Cases of Foreign Investment in Korean Banks
Working
Paper 07-12 Jong Bum Kim Territoriality Principle under Preferential Rules of Origin
Working
Paper 07-13 Seong Ho CHO
THE EFFECT OF TARGET OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON THE TAKEOVER
PREMIUM IN OWNER-MANAGER DOMINANT ACQUISITIONS: EVIDENCE
FROM KOREAN CASES
Working
Paper 07-14
Seong Ho CHO
Bill McKelvey Determining Industry Substructure: A Stock Return Approach
Working
Paper 07-15 Dong-Young KIM Enhancing BATNA Analysis in Korean Public Disputes
Working
Paper 07-16 Dong-Young KIM
The Use of Integrated Assessment to Support Multi-Stakeholder negotiations for
Complex Environmental Decision-Making
Working
Paper 07-17 Yuri Mansury
Measuring the Impact of a Catastrophic Event: Integrating Geographic Information
System with Social Accounting Matrix
Working
Paper 07-18 Yuri Mansury
Promoting Inter-Regional Cooperation between Israel and Palestine:
A Structural Path Analysis Approach
Working
Paper 07-19 Ilho YOO Public Finance in Korea since Economic Crisis
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Working
Paper 07-20
Li GAN
Jaeun SHIN
Qi LI
Initial Wage, Human Capital and Post Wage Differentials
Working
Paper 07-21 Jin PARK
Public Entity Reform during the Roh Administration:
Analysis through Best Practices
Working
Paper 07-22 Tae Hee Choi The Equity Premium Puzzle: An Empirical Investigation of Korean Stock Market
Working
Paper 07-23 Joong H. HAN The Dynamic Structure of CEO Compensation: An Empirical Study
Working
Paper 07-24 Ki-Eun RHEE Endogenous Switching Costs in the Face of Poaching
Working
Paper 08-01
Sun LEE
Kwon JUNG Effects of Price Comparison Site on Price and Value Perceptions in Online Purchase
Working
Paper 08-02 Ilho YOO Is Korea Moving Toward the Welfare State?: An IECI Approach
Working
Paper 08-03
Ilho YOO
Inhyouk KOO
DO CHILDREN SUPPORT THEIR PARENTS' APPLICATION FOR THE REVERSE
MORTGAGE?: A KOREAN CASE
Working
Paper 08-04 Seong-Ho CHO Raising Seoul’s Global Competitiveness: Developing Key Performance Indicators
Working
Paper 08-05 Jin PARK A Critical Review for Best Practices of Public Entities in Korea
Working
Paper 08-06 Seong-Ho CHO How to Value a Private Company? -Case of Miele Korea-
Working
Paper 08-07 Yoon Ha Yoo The East Asian Miracle: Export-led or Investment-led?
Working
Paper 08-08 Man Cho Subprime Mortgage Market: Rise, Fall, and Lessons for Korea
Working
Paper 08-09
Woochan KIM
Woojin KIM
Kap-sok KWON
Value of shareholder activism: evidence from the switchers
Working
Paper 08-10 Kun-Ho Lee Risk Management in Korean Financial Institutions: Ten Years after the Financial Crisis
Working
Paper 08-11 Jong Bum KIM
Korea’s Institutional Framework for FTA Negotiations and Administration: Tariffs and
Rules of Origin
Working
Paper 08-12 Yu Sang CHANG
Strategy, Structure, and Channel of Industrial Service Leaders:
A Flow Chart Analysis of the Expanded Value Chain
Working
Paper 08-13 Younguck KANG Sensitivity Analysis of Equivalency Scale in Income Inequality Studies
Working
Paper 08-14 Younguck KANG Case Study: Adaptive Implementation of the Five-Year Economic Development Plans
Working
Paper 08-15 Joong H. HAN
Is Lending by Banks and Non-banks Different? Evidence from Small Business
Financing
Working
Paper 08-16 Joong H. HAN Checking Accounts and Bank Lending
Working
Paper 08-17 Seongwuk MOON
How Does the Management of Research Impact the Disclosure of Knowledge?
Evidence from Scientific Publications and Patenting Behavior
Working
Paper 08-18 Jungho YOO
How Korea’s Rapid Export Expansion Began in the 1960s:
The Role of Foreign Exchange Rate
Working
Paper 08-19
BERNARD S. BLACK
WOOCHAN KIM
HASUNG JANG
KYUNG SUH PARK
How Corporate Governance Affects Firm Value: Evidence on Channels from Korea
Working
Paper 08-20 Tae Hee CHOI
Meeting or Beating Analysts' Forecasts: Empirical Evidence of Firms' Characteristics,
Persistence Patterns and Post-scandal Changes
Working
Paper 08-21 Jaeun SHIN
Understanding the Role of Private Health Insurance in the Universal Coverage System:
Macro and Micro Evidence
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Working
Paper 08-22 Jin PARK Indonesian Bureaucracy Reform: Lessons from Korea
Working
Paper 08-23 Joon-Kyung KIM Recent Changes in Korean Households' Indebtedness and Debt Service Capacity
Working
Paper 08-24 Yuri Mansury
What Do We Know about the Geographic Pattern of Growth across Cities and Regions
in South Korea?
Working
Paper 08-25
Yuri Mansury &
Jae Kyun Shin
Why Do Megacities Coexist with Small Towns? Historical Dependence in the
Evolution of Urban Systems
Working
Paper 08-26 Jinsoo LEE When Business Groups Employ Analysts: Are They Biased?
Working
Paper 08-27
Cheol S. EUN
Jinsoo LEE Mean-Variance Convergence Around the World
Working
Paper 08-28 Seongwuk MOON
How Does Job Design Affect Productivity and Earnings?
Implications of the Organization of Production
Working
Paper 08-29 Jaeun SHIN Smoking, Time Preference and Educational Outcomes
Working
Paper 08-30 Dong Young KIM
Reap the Benefits of the Latecomer:
From the story of a political, cultural, and social movement of ADR in US
Working
Paper 08-31 Ji Hong KIM Economic Crisis Management in Korea: 1998 & 2008
Working
Paper 08-32 Dong-Young KIM
Civility or Creativity?: Application of Dispute Systems Design (DSD) to Korean Public
Controversies on Waste Incinerators
Working
Paper 08-33 Ki-Eun RHEE Welfare Effects of Behavior-Based Price Discrimination
Working
Paper 08-34 Ji Hong KIM State Owned Enterprise Reform
Working
Paper 09-01 Yu Sang CHANG Making Strategic Short-term Cost Estimation by Annualized Experience Curve
Working
Paper 09-02 Dong Young KIM
When Conflict Management is Institutionalized:
A Review of the Executive Order 19886 and government practice
Working
Paper 09-03 Man Cho
Managing Mortgage Credit Risk:
What went wrong with the subprime and Alt-A markets?
Working
Paper 09-04 Tae H. Choi Business Ethics, Cost of Capital, and Valuation
Working
Paper 09-05
Woochan KIM
Woojin KIM
Hyung-Seok KIM
What makes firms issue death spirals? A control enhancing story
Working
Paper 09-06
Yu Sang CHANG
Seung Jin BAEK
Limit to Improvement: Myth or Reality? Empirical Analysis of Historical Improvement
on Three Technologies Influential in the Evolution of Civilization
Working
Paper 09-07 Ji Hong KIM G20: Global Imbalance and Financial Crisis
Working
Paper 09-08 Ji Hong KIM National Competitiveness in the Globalized Era
Working
Paper 09-09
Hao Jiang
Woochan Kim
Ramesh K. S. Rao
Contract Heterogeneity, Operating Shortfalls, and Corporate Cash Holdings
Working
Paper 09-10 Man CHO Home Price Cycles: A Tale of Two Countries
Working
Paper 09-11 Dongcul CHO The Republic of Korea’s Economy in the Swirl of Global Crisis
Working
Paper 09-12 Dongcul CHO House Prices in ASEAN+3: Recent Trends and Inter-Dependence
Working
Paper 09-13
Seung-Joo LEE
Eun-Hyung LEE
Case Study of POSCO -
Analysis of its Growth Strategy and Key Success Factors
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Working
Paper 09-14
Woochan KIM
Taeyoon SUNG
Shang-Jin WEI
The Value of Foreign Blockholder Activism:
Which Home Country Governance Characteristics Matter?
Working
Paper 09-15 Joon-Kyung KIM Post-Crisis Corporate Reform and Internal Capital Markets in Chaebols
Working
Paper 09-16 Jin PARK Lessons from SOE Management and Privatization in Korea
Working
Paper 09-17 Tae Hee CHOI Implied Cost of Equity Capital, Firm Valuation, and Firm Characteristics
Working
Paper 09-18 Kwon JUNG
Are Entrepreneurs and Managers Different?
Values and Ethical Perceptions of Entrepreneurs and Managers
Working
Paper 09-19 Seongwuk MOON When Does a Firm Seek External Knowledge? Limitations of External Knowledge
Working
Paper 09-20 Seongwuk MOON Earnings Inequality within a Firm: Evidence from a Korean Insurance Company
Working
Paper 09-21 Jaeun SHIN Health Care Reforms in South Korea: What Consequences in Financing?
Working
Paper 09-22 Younguck KANG
Demand Analysis of Public Education: A Quest for New Public Education System for
Next Generation
Working
Paper 09-23
Seong-Ho CHO
Jinsoo LEE Valuation and Underpricing of IPOs in Korea
Working
Paper 09-24 Seong-Ho CHO Kumho Asiana’s LBO Takeover on Korea Express
Working
Paper 10-01
Yun-Yeong KIM
Jinsoo LEE Identification of Momentum and Disposition Effects Through Asset Return Volatility
Working
Paper 10-02 Kwon JUNG
Four Faces of Silver Consumers:
A Typology, Their Aspirations, and Life Satisfaction of Older Korean Consumers
Working
Paper 10-03
Jinsoo LEE
Seongwuk MOON
Corporate Governance and
International Portfolio Investment in Equities
Working
Paper 10-04 Jinsoo LEE Global Convergence in Tobin’s Q Ratios
Working
Paper 10-05 Seongwuk MOON
Competition, Capability Buildup and Innovation: The Role of Exogenous Intra-firm
Revenue Sharing
Working
Paper 10-06 Kwon JUNG Credit Card Usage Behaviors among Elderly Korean Consumers
Working
Paper 10-07
Yu-Sang CHANG
Jinsoo LEE Forecasting Road Fatalities by the Use of Kinked Experience Curve
Working
Paper 10-08 Man CHO Securitization and Asset Price Cycle: Causality and Post-Crisis Policy Reform
Working
Paper 10-09
Man CHO
Insik MIN Asset Market Correlation and Stress Testing: Cases for Housing and Stock Markets
Working
Paper 10-10
Yu-Sang CHANG
Jinsoo LEE
Is Forecasting Future Suicide Rates Possible?
- Application of the Experience Curve -
Working
Paper 10-11 Seongwuk MOON
What Determines the Openness of Korean Manufacturing Firms to External
Knowledge?
Working
Paper 10-12
Joong Ho HAN
Kwangwoo PARK
George PENNACCHI
Corporate Taxes and Securitization
Working
Paper 10-13 Younguck KANG Housing Policy of Korea: Old Paradigm, New Approach
Working
Paper 10-14 Il Chong NAM A Proposal to Reform the Korean CBP Market
Working
Paper 10-15 Younguck KANG
Balanced Regional Growth Strategy based on the Economies of Agglomeration:
the Other Side of Story
Working
Paper 10-16 Joong Ho HAN CEO Equity versus Inside Debt Holdings and Private Debt Contracting
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Working
Paper 11-01
Yeon-Koo CHE
Rajiv SETHI
Economic Consequences of Speculative Side Bets:
The Case of Naked Credit Default Swaps
Working
Paper 11-02
Tae Hee CHOI
Martina SIPKOVA Business Ethics in the Czech Republic
Working
Paper 11-03
Sunwoo HWANG
Woochan KIM
Anti-Takeover Charter Amendments and Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from
Korea
Working
Paper 11-04
Yu Sang CHANG
Jinsoo LEE
Yun Seok JUNG
The Speed and Impact of a New Technology Diffusion in Organ Transplantation:
A Case Study Approach
Working
Paper 11-05
Jin PARK
Jiwon LEE
The Direction of Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund
Based on ODA Standard
Working
Paper 11-06 Woochan KIM Korea Investment Corporation: Its Origin and Evolution
Working
Paper 11-07 Seung-Joo LEE
Dynamic Capabilities at Samsung Electronics:
Analysis of its Growth Strategy in Semiconductors
Working
Paper 11-08 Joong Ho HAN Deposit Insurance and Industrial Volatility
Working
Paper 11-09 Dong-Young KIM
Transformation from Conflict to Collaboration through Multistakeholder Process:
Shihwa Sustainable Development Committee in Korea
Working
Paper 11-10 Seongwuk MOON
How will Openness to External Knowledge Impact Service Innovation? Evidence from
Korean Service Sector
Working
Paper 11-11 Jin PARK
Korea’s Technical Assistance for Better Governance:
A Case Study in Indonesia
Working
Paper 12-01 Seongwuk MOON
How Did Korea Catch Up with Developed Countries in DRAM Industry? The Role of
Public Sector in Demand Creation: PART 1
Working
Paper 12-02
Yong S. Lee
Young U. Kang
Hun J Park
The Workplace Ethics of Public Servants in Developing Countries
Working
Paper 12-03 Ji-Hong KIM Deposit Insurance System in Korea and Reform
Working
Paper 12-04
Yu Sang Chang
Jinsoo Lee
Yun Seok Jung
Technology Improvement Rates of Knowledge Industries following Moore’s Law?
-An Empirical Study of Microprocessor, Mobile Cellular, and Genome Sequencing
Technologies-
Working
Paper 12-05 Man Cho Contagious Real Estate Cycles: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Implications
Working
Paper 12-06
Younguck KANG
Dhani Setvawan
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER AND THE FLYPAPER EFFECT
– Evidence from Municipalities/Regencies in Indonesia –
Working
Paper 12-07 Younguck KANG
Civil Petitions and Appeals in Korea
: Investigating Rhetoric and Institutional settings
Working
Paper 12-08
Yu Sang Chang
Jinsoo Lee
Alternative Projection of the World Energy Consumption
-in Comparison with the 2010 International Energy Outlook
Working
Paper 12-09 Hyeok Jeong The Price of Experience
Working
Paper 12-10 Hyeok Jeong Complementarity and Transition to Modern Economic Growth
Working
Paper 13-01
Yu Sang CHANG
Jinsoo LEE
Hyuk Ju KWON
When Will the Millennium Development Goal on Infant Mortality Rate Be Realized?
- Projections for 21 OECD Countries through 2050-
Working
Paper 13-02 Yoon-Ha Yoo
Stronger Property Rights Enforcement Does Not Hurt Social Welfare
-A Comment on Gonzalez’ “Effective Property Rights, Conflict and Growth (JET,
2007)”-
Working
Paper 13-03
Yu Sang CHANG
Changyong CHOI
Will the Stop TB Partnership Targets on TB Control be Realized on Schedule?
- Projection of Future Incidence, Prevalence and Death Rates -
Working
Paper 13-04
Yu Sang CHANG
Changyong CHOI
Can We Predict Long-Term Future Crime Rates?
– Projection of Crime Rates through 2030 for Individual States in the U.S. –
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Working
Paper 13-05 Chrysostomos Tabakis Free-Trade Areas and Special Protection
Working
Paper 13-06 Hyeok Jeong Dynamics of Firms and Trade in General Equilibrium
Working
Paper 13-07 Hyeok Jeong Testing Solow's Implications on the Effective Development Policy
Working
Paper 13-08 Jaeun SHIN Long-Term Care Insurance and Health Care Financing in South Korea
Working
Paper 13-09 Ilchong Nam
Investment Incentives for Nuclear Generators and Competition in the Electricity Market
of Korea
Working
Paper 13-10 Ilchong Nam Market Structure of the Nuclear Power Industry in Korea and Incentives of Major Firms
Working
Paper 13-11 Ji Hong KIM Global Imbalances
Working
Paper 14-01 Woochan KIM When Heirs Become Major Shareholders
Working
Paper 14-02 Chrysostomos Tabakis Antidumping Echoing
Working
Paper 14-03 Ju Ho Lee
Is Korea Number One in Human Capital Accumulation?:
Education Bubble Formation and its Labor Market Evidence
Working
Paper 14-04 Chrysostomos Tabakis Regionalism and Con ict: Peace Creation and Peace Diversion
Working
Paper 14-05 Ju Ho Lee
Making Education Reform Happen:
Removal of Education Bubble through Education Diversification
Working
Paper 14-06 Sung Joon Paik
Pre-employment VET Investment Strategy in Developing Countries
- Based on the Experiences of Korea -
Working
Paper 14-07
Ju Ho Lee
Josh Sung-Chang Ryoo
Sam-Ho Lee
From Multiple Choices to Performance Assessment:
Theory, Practice, and Strategy
Working
Paper 14-08 Sung Joon Paik
Changes in the effect of education on the earnings differentials between men and
women in Korea (1990-2010)
Working
Paper 14-09 Shun Wang
Social Capital and Rotating Labor Associations:
Evidence from China
Working
Paper 14-10 Hun Joo Park
Recasting the North Korean Problem:
Towards Critically Rethinking about the Perennial Crisis of the Amoral Family State
and How to Resolve It
Working
Paper 14-11 Yooncheong Cho  Justice, Dissatisfaction, and Public Confidence in the E-Governance)
Working
Paper 14-12 Shun Wang The Long-Term Consequences of Family Class Origins in Urban China
Working
Paper 14-13 Jisun Baek Effect of High-speed Train Introduction on Consumer Welfare
Working
Paper 14-14 Jisun Baek Effect of High Speed Trains on Passenger Travel: Evidence from Korea
Working
Paper 15-01 Tae-Hee Choi Governance and Business Ethics - An International Analysis
Working
Paper 15-02 Jisun Baek
The Impact of Improved Passenger Transport System on Manufacturing Plant
Productivity
Working
Paper 15-03 Shun Wang
The Unintended Long-term Consequences of Mao’s Mass Send-Down Movement:
Marriage, Social Network, and Happiness
Working
Paper 15-04 Changyong Choi
Information and Communication Technology and the Authoritarian Regime:
A Case Study of North Korea
Working
Paper 15-05
Wonhyuk Lim
William P. Mako
AIIB Business Strategy Decisions:
 What Can It Do Differently to Make a Difference?
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Working
Paper 15-06
Ju-Ho Lee
Kiwan Kim
Song-Chang Hong
JeeHee Yoon
Can Bureaucrats Stimulate High-Risk High-Payoff Research?
Working
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